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Jeff Dykes* and Otway B. Denny, Jr.**
I. HEALTH, LIFE, AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
N Tomlinson v. Jones' the father of a deceased insured brought suit
against the insured's wife to recover life insurance proceeds. While the
ury found that the deceased lacked sufficient mental capacity to change
the beneficiary on his life insurance policy, the trial court granted the wife
judgment n.o.v. and gave the proceeds to the deceased's wife. The court of
appeals affirmed.2 The deceased's father, Herschel Tomlinson, Sr., was
named the original beneficiary of the insurance policies and remained the
beneficiary for approximately six years until the week before the insured's
death in 1975.
The deceased was involved in a serious automobile accident on December
15, 1974, and remained in the hospital until his death on January 25, 1975.
On January 18, 1975, the deceased allegedly consented to the execution of a
special power of attorney authorizing his wife to change the beneficiary on
his life insurance policy from his father to his wife. The deceased was too
badly burned to sign this document. His wife signed it on his behalf. His
wife, together with the two witnesses, testified that they believed that the
deceased was alert, understood what was being contemplated, and affirma-
tively consented to the execution of the document in question. Later that
day the wife notified the trustees of the retirement plan to change the
beneficiary.
The trial court in granting a judgment n.o.v. noted the lack of evidence to
support the jury finding of insufficient mental capacity and ruled, in any
event, that such a finding was irrelevant because the contract between the
trust and the insurer gave the trustees the power to change the beneficiary on
their own initiative.3 The court of appeals affirmed, finding sufficient evi-
* B.A., M.A., Stanford University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Ful-
bright & Jaworksi, Houston, Texas.
** B.A., Texas A&M University; J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Fulbright &
Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 445 (June 20, 1984).
2. 664 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983).
3. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 446. Two provisions of the trust agreement clearly gave the
deceased the right to designate the beneficiaries of his policies. The trustees were authorized to
name the beneficiaries only if for some reason the deceased failed to do so. The relevant provi-
sions of the contract are:
Section 5.07-In the event of the death of a participant prior to normal retire-
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dence to support the jury finding of mental incapacity, but agreeing with the
trial court that such a finding was irrelevant.4
The supreme court agreed with the appellate court's holding that enough
evidence existed to support the jury's finding of no capacity. The court,
however, disagreed with the court of appeals that such a finding was irrele-
vant. 5 The supreme court decided that the trust agreement gave the right of
designating the beneficiary to the deceased, thereby making the determina-
tion of the deceased's mental capacity critically important.6 The court held
that the special power of attorney executed on January 18, 1975, was a nul-
lity in light of the jury's finding of no capacity on behalf of the deceased. 7
In Members Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hermann Hospital8 the court was
presented with the issue of whether a hospital lien attached to the insurer's
payment of uninsured motorist benefits to a hospital patient. The insured,
Hall, was involved in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist.
Her passenger, George Walker, suffered injuries and was hospitalized in
Hermann Hospital. Hermann charged approximately $60,000 for services to
Walker and filed notice of its hospital lien with the county clerk as provided
by article 5506a, section 4.9 Walker sued the uninsured motorist and Mem-
bers Mutual for recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage of Hall's
policy provided by Members Mutual. Walker died during the suit, and
Members Mutual paid $7,000 to Walker's heir. Hermann Hospital received
no money from the settlement and was not a party to the release. Hermann
Hospital then sued Members Mutual to impose the article 5506a hospital
lien on the uninsured motorist benefits that had already been paid by Mem-
bers Mutual. Both parties moved for a summary judgment, agreeing that
the sole issue of law was whether a hospital lien attaches to settlement pro-
ceeds of uninsured motorist coverage. The trial court held in favor of Her-
mann Hospital and ruled that Members Mutual was liable to the hospital for
$7,000. The Houston court of civil appeals affirmed.10
The supreme court stated that the purpose of article 5506a was to en-
courage hospitals to provide immediate care and treatment to persons in-
ment date, the Trustees shall instruct the life insurance company to pay the
beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the employee in the policy or policies
on his life or annuity, or, if none be so designated, to his estate, the death bene-
fits provided by the terms of such policy or policies ....
Section 9.02-If any participant shall fail to instruct the Trustees to designate
a beneficiary or beneficiaries, the Trustees shall designate as beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries on his behalf, in the order named, these persons in the following classes
who survive the participant: (1) spouse, (2) issue, per stirpes, (3) parents,
(4) brothers and sisters, (5) nephews and nieces, and (6) estate of the participant.
Id. at 445 (emphasis by the court).
4. 664 S.W.2d at 125-26.
5. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 446.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 664 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. 1984).
9. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5506a (Vernon 1958) (recodified as TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. §§ 55.001-.008 (Vernon 1984)).
10. 659 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983).
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jured in accidents and to compensate hospitals for treating such patients."1
The court further noted that the legislature specifically exempted from the
article 5506a statutory lien all proceeds from an insurance policy in favor of
the injured party, as a beneficiary or a legal representative.' 2 A lien, how-
ever, does attach to public liability insurance carried by the insured to pro-
tect him against loss or damage occurring because of an accident or collision
covered by the public liability insurance policy.' 3 The court held that the
lien attached only if the insurance proceeds are paid under a public liability
insurance policy. 14 A public liability policy protects the insured against
damage claims for which the insured may become liable instead of insuring
against injuries suffered by the insured himself in an accident." The court
noted that in contrast to liability insurance, uninsured motorist coverage in-
sures against accidents caused by negligent, financially irresponsible motor-
ists.16 Since in this case the uninsured motorist coverage did not protect the
insured from liability for damages caused to others, it did not fit within the
definition of public liability insurance. The court, therefore, held that the
proceeds of uninsured motorist coverage are not subject to a hospital lien
filed under article 5506a. 17
The case of Alvarado v. Pilot Life Insurance Co. 18 concerned the interpre-
tation of "severance" in an accidental death and dismemberment policy is-
sued by Pilot Life to Alvarado. Under the terms of the policy, the insured
would recover one-half of the policy proceeds if he suffered a loss of a mem-
ber because of or within ninety days of an accident. Additionally, the terms
of the policy provided that loss of a member means "[a] loss of a foot by
severance at or above the ankle."' 19 Alvarado apparently shot himself in the
left ankle with a .44 magnum pistol and was hospitalized in Fort Worth on
November 3, 1979. This accident caused severe injuries to his left ankle and
on April 1, 1981, his left leg was surgically amputated below the knee. Pilot
11. 664 S.W.2d at 326; see Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. Borders, 581 S.W.2d 731, 733
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.); Hospital Lien Act, ch. 85, § S, 1933 Tex. Gen.
Laws 182, 185.
12. 664 S.W.2d at 326.
13. Id at 326-27.
14. See id. The court stated:
The term "public liability insurance" has been defined as: "[i]nsurance liabil-
ity protection against claims arising out of the insured's property, conduct or the
conduct of his agent," Black's Law Dictionary 724 (rev. 5th ed. 1979); "general
liability insurance, or insurance such as protects a person against loss or liability
by reason of personal injuries to other than employees," 1 G. Couch, Couch on
Insurance § 1:93 (Rev.2d Ed. 1984); and "insurance ... to indemnify the in-
sured against loss by reason of legal liability .... 2 R. Long, The Law of
Liability Insurance § 10.01 (1983).
Id. at 327.
15. 664 S.W.2d at 326; see Cain v. American Policyholders Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 645, 183
A. 403 (1936).
16. 664 S.W.2d at 327; see Frances v. International Serv. Ins. Co., 546 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.
1976); Employers Casualty Co. v. Sloan, 565 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
17. 664 S.W.2d at 328.
18. 663 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. Id. at 109.
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Life moved for a summary judgment, arguing that as a matter of law Alva-
rado's loss was not covered since he did not suffer a loss of the foot by sever-
ance at or above the ankle within ninety days of the November 3, 1979, date
of occurrence. The trial court granted the summary judgment.
Alvarado's position on appeal was that the term "severance" is ambiguous
and should be strictly construed against the carrier and that fact issues ex-
isted as to whether appellant did suffer a severance within ninety days. Al-
varado relied on Reliance Insurance Co. v. Kinman,20 which held that the
term severance was ambiguous. The court distinguished Kinman because in
that case the leg was not removed or amputated for some eighteen months
because doctors feared amputation might cause death. 2 1 The court, in af-
firming the trial court's grant of the summary judgment, held that the term
severance was not ambiguous. 22 The court would not thus rewrite the pol-
icy, and since the insured did not suffer a severance at or below the ankle
within ninety days of the date of the incident, the summary judgment was
affirmed.
II. LIABILITY INSURANCE
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Marr's Shortstop of Texas, Inc. 23 the
court considered whether the pilot of an airplane that crashed was properly
rated for the flight within the meaning of the aviation liability insurance
policy.24 The trial court submitted two issues to the jury: first, whether the
weather conditions at the beginning of the flight required the use of instru-
ment flight rules (IFR),25 and second, whether the pilot knew that he would
be flying in IFR weather conditions at the beginning of the flight. The jury
found that visual flight rules (VFR) conditions existed at the time of take off,
but the pilot knew when he took off that he would be flying in IFR condi-
tions some time before the end of the flight. The first answer supported the
owner, and the second answer supported the insurer. The trial court disre-
garded the first answer and rendered judgment for the carrier. The court of
appeals held that Glover v. National Insurance Underwriters26 required the
flight to be characterized at its inception and that the jury's answer to the
second issue was immaterial. 27 The court, therefore, reversed the holding of
20. 252 Ark. 1168, 483 S.W.2d 166 (1972).
21. 663 S.W.2d at 110.
22. Id. The court quoted from Webster's Third International Dictionary in stating that
"'severance' means the act or process of severing, the state of being severed." Id.; see WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2091 (1981). "Sever" means "to put asun-
der. . . to disjoin or disunite from one another. . . to divide or break up into parts .... "
Id. at 2090; see also Cornellier v. American Casualty Co., 389 F.2d 641, 643 (2d Cir. 1968)
(similar policy interpretation).
23. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 310 (Apr. 7, 1984).
24. The policy contained the following pilot clause: "Only the following pilot or pilots
holding valid and effective pilot and medical certificates with ratings as required by the Federal
Aviation Administration for the flight involved will operate the aircraft in question: RON-
ALD EUGENE MARR." Id.
25. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.3(e), 91.115 (1983).
26. 545 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1977).
27. 643 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1982).
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the trial court and held that the insurance company had failed to prove that
the pilot was not properly rated for the flight. 28
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.29 The court agreed with the court of civil ap-
peals' holding that some evidence supported the finding that at the inception
of the flight in question, Marr knew that he would be flying into IFR
weather conditions. 30 The supreme court, however, believed that the court
of appeals erred in relying upon the Glover case. 31 The error was in ignoring
the finding that Marr, at the inception of the flight, knew he would be flying
in IFR weather conditions. In the Glover case, the supreme court had held
that a court in deciding whether a pilot was properly rated for the flight
must make the determination from the flight in its entirety.32 In Glover the
supreme court held that it would not break the flight into segments, so that
coverage flickered on and off as the plane moved from VFR to IFR condi-
tions. 33 The court also held in Glover that weather conditions that existed at
the beginning of the flight should be examined to make the determination. 34
In Glover the pilot flew in visual flying weather about one-third of the way
and then ran into unexpected IFR conditions. The pilot did not know when
he took off that he was flying into IFR weather conditions. In contrast, the
jury found that Marr knew he would face IFR conditions when he took off.
The supreme court, therefore, affirmed the trial court and entered judgment
for the carrier. 35
In a dissenting opinion, 36 Justices Robinson and Ray acknowledged that
Marr knew that he would be flying in IFR weather, for which he was not
properly rated. The question to them was the relevance of Marr's knowl-
edge to the issues presented. Justices Robinson and Ray argued that the
pilot's knowledge was immaterial and that the majority opinion was overrul-
ing the Glover rules since the pilot's knowledge of weather conditions rather
than the actual weather conditions existing at the beginning of the flight is
now to be considered the ultimate issue in characterizing flights for the pur-
pose of aircraft insurance pilot clauses. 37
Puckett v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 38 was a declaratory judgment
action concerning whether an insured's failure to have his plane inspected
must be the cause of an accident in order for the insurance company to avoid
liability under an aviation policy. The trial court held that causation was
28. Id. at 517.
29. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 312.
30. Id. at 310.
31. Id. at 312.
32. 545 S.W.2d at 762.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 762-63. The court in Glover also stated that the pilot's knowledge of weather
conditions along his flight path or at his destination would not be controlling in characterizing
the flight as VFR or IFR. Id. at 763.
35. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 312.
36. Id. at 313 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 55 (Oct. 24, 1984).
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not required and granted a summary judgment for the carrier. The court of
appeals in an unpublished opinion affirmed. The supreme court reversed the
judgment of both courts and remanded the case for trial.39
An airplane jointly owned by Holt and Puckett crashed on July 18, 1981.
Puckett as pilot and two passengers were killed, and a third passenger was
seriously injured. A declaratory judgment action was brought by United
States Fire Insurance against Holt and the administrators of Puckett's estate
to determine whether the carrier was obligated to pay any damages or de-
fend any claim arising out of the crash. The carrier relied on a clause in a
policy suspending coverage if the aircraft's air worthiness certificate was in-
valid. Under federal law the certificate in question was effective only so long
as all maintenance requirements had been met.4° The requirements also in-
cluded an annual inspection.41 The parties stipulated that no such inspec-
tion had been performed and that the failure to have the plane inspected was
in no way a cause of the accident.
The supreme court noted that most courts addressing the question have
held that causation is not required for an insurance company to avoid liabil-
ity on the basis of a breach of a condition in an aviation policy.42 The court
noted, however, that unanimity in holding that causation was required did
not exist. 43 The court reasoned that the better rule was to require causa-
tion.44 United States Fire Insurance, therefore, could avoid liability only if
the failure to inspect was either the sole or one of the several causes of the
accident, even though the policy did not require a causal connection between
the breach of the policy and the accident.
The court held that the clause violated public policy since no causation
existed.45 The accident was caused by pilot error, which was unquestionably
covered by the policy. The court decided that it would be against public
policy to allow the insurance company to avoid liability because of a breach
39. Id. at 56.
40. 14 C.F.R. § 21.18(a)(1) (1981).
41. Id. §§ 91.165, .169.
42. For cases holding that causation is not required, see Arnold v. Globe Indem. Co., 416
F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying Kentucky law); DiSanto v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 489
F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1980); National Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Bequette, 280 F. Supp. 842
(D. Alaska 1968), af'd, 429 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1970); Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bright, 106
Cal. App. 3d 282, 165 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1980); O'Conner v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 661 P.2d 1181
(Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Grigsby v. Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 572, 148
S.E.2d 925 (1966); Kilburn v. Union Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 115, 40 N.W.2d 90
(1949); Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Omaha Skydivers
Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 189 Neb. 610, 204 N.W.2d 162 (1973); Security Mut.
Casualty Co. v. O'Brien, 99 N.M. 638, 662 P.2d 639 (1983); Baker v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
10 N.C. App. 605, 179 S.E.2d 892 (1971); Ochs v. Avemco Ins. Co., 54 Or. App. 768, 636 P.2d
421 (1981).
43. For cases holding that causation is required, see Migues v. Universal Airways Co., 18
Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,250 (S.D. Miss. 1982); Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, 510 F. Supp.
1204 (D. Mont. 1981); American States Ins. Co. v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 976
(S.D. Ill. 1978); Avemo Ins. Co. v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142 (D. Hawaii 1975); Ranger Ins.
Co. v. Phillips, 25 Ariz. App. 426, 544 P.2d 250 (1976); South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Collins, 269
S.C. 282, 237 S.E.2d 358 (1977).
44. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 55-56.
45. Id. at 56.
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that amounted to nothing more than a technicality.46 By so holding the
court overruled an earlier decision directly on point with United States
Fire's position.47
Justice Pope noted in dissent that the insurer lived up to its contract and
the insured did not.48 He agreed with the majority that the policy was clear
and unambiguous. 49 The policy required only that the insured comply with
federal safety regulations and that the plane be submitted to periodic safety
inspections. These actions were not taken, and for that reason no coverage
should result. 50
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Francis5 1 the court of
appeals determined the meaning of "user" as it applied in the context of the
insurance policy in question. In December 1975 Joseph Chevalier, Earl El-
lis, and two other men embarked on a hunting trip to Galveston County.
Before the trip a trailer holding a boat and motor, both owned by Ellis, was
hooked to a pickup truck owned by Chevalier and insured by State Farm.
Chevalier, the driver, and Ellis, a passenger, were traveling on Highway 45
toward Galveston when the boat and motor fell from the trailer and struck
an automobile being driven by Francis. Francis sued Chevalier and Ellis for
personal injuries. Ellis was found negligent, but Chevalier, the driver, was
found not negligent. State Farm refused to pay the judgment on behalf of
Ellis, and as a result Francis sued to collect on the judgment, claiming that
Ellis was an insured under the policy because he was a permissive user as
defined by the policy.52 State Farm contended that Ellis was not a user be-
cause only Chevalier, as driver, was using the trailer and boat and that the
negligence, as found by the jury in the personal injury case against Ellis,
preceded the use of the boat with the truck. It further argued that as a
passenger, Ellis could not be a user under the policy. The trial court dis-
46. The court thought this situation analogous to the antitechnicality statute covering fire
insurance policies, TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 6.14 (Vernon 1981), and believed that the legis-
lature's action in passing such an antitechnicality statute was indicative of public policy. 28
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 56.
47. Schepps Grocer Supply Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 545 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1976, writ refd n.r.e.) (pilot's failure to adhere to rating requirements was a bar to
recovery even though no causal connection existed between the failure and the accident).
48. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 57 (Pope, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 58.
50. Id. According to Justice Pope:
Today's decision means that insurance policies-life, casualty, fire-though
agreed upon by insured and insurer, though authorized by the Board of Insur-
ance, though clear and unambiguous, are burdened with uncertain terms that
this court may from time to time determine should have been included in the
parties' contract. The court characterizes the insurer's breach as "nothing more
than a technicality." Aircraft safety a technicality? The object of the policy
provision requiring compliance with the federal regulations is safety.
28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 58.
51. 669 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
52. In Part 1, Coverage B, Persons Insured, the policy provided as follows: "(2) any other
person using such automobile with the permission of the named insured, provided his actual
operation or (if he is not operating) his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such
permission .... " Id. at 426. Under Definitions, Part 1, the policy provided that " 'use' of
an automobile includes the loading and unloading thereof." Id.
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agreed and granted summary judgment for Francis. In agreeing with the
trial court, the court cited several cases in other jurisdictions that held that a
passenger may be a user.5 3 Since the policy in question provided coverage
for damages caused from the ownership, maintenance, or use, no proximate
causation need be shown between the use of the automobile or trailer and the
accident.54
The trial court's finding that Ellis failed to secure the boat properly to the
trailer entailed a finding that Ellis had negligently loaded the trailer.55 Prop-
erly securing the boat to the trailer would be an important aspect of the
loading, since it would be absolutely necessary for the safe operation and
transportation of the boat.56 Loading and unloading is not confined to acts
occurring during the actual loading and unloading, but also includes the in-
termediate step of the transportation of the goods from the starting point to
the destination. 57
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Protective Insurance Co. 58 involved a deter-
mination of duty to defend. Protective Insurance Company, as the carrier
for Atlas Truck Lines, Inc., sought a declaratory judgment against Aetna, as
the carrier for B.F. Walker, Inc., to discover whether Aetna should defend
Atlas. In October 1979 Stebbens leased his truck to his employer, B.F.
Walker, for various hauling jobs. When Stebbens, in the course of his em-
ployment for Walker, arrived at Atlas he was instructed by a security guard
to wait until Atlas employees could load his truck. After waiting approxi-
mately forty-five minutes, Atlas's yard foreman told Stebbens where to park
his truck so it could be loaded. Stebbens parked the truck as instructed, and
Atlas began loading pipe onto the trailer. Stebbens was directing the loading
and arrangement of the pipe when the accident occurred and Stebbens was
injured. Stebbens then sued Atlas and Protective, contending that Atlas was
an omnibus insured under Walker's insurance policy with Aetna. Protective
demanded that Aetna defend and indemnify Atlas from the third-party suit.
Aetna refused to accede to the demand.
Aetna had issued a comprehensive automobile liability insurance policy to
B.F. Walker.59 The coverage question presented was the existence of a fact
53. Id. at 427 (citing Home Indem. v. Lively, 353 F. Supp. 1191 (D.C. Okla. 1972); Na-
tional Am. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 74 Cal. App. 3d 565, 140 Cal. Rptr. 828
(1977); Transamerica Ins. Group v. United Ins. Co., 92 Wash. 2d 21, 593 P.2d 156 (1979)).
54. See Blue Bird Body v. Ryder Truck Rental, 583 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1978).
55. 669 S.W.2d at 427.
56. Id.
57. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Employers Casualty Co., 380 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1964).
58. 661 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
59. The pertinent portions of the policy are as follows:
II. PERSONS INSURED
Each of the following is an insured under this insurance to the extent set
forth below:
(a) the named insured [B.F. Walker, Inc.];
(c) any other person while using an owned automobile or a hired automo-
bile with the permission of the named insured, provided his actual opera-
tion or (if he is not operating) his other actual use thereof is within the
scope of such permission, but with respect to bodily injury or property
[Vol. 39
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issue as to whether Atlas was a borrower of the truck within the meaning of
the loading and unloading coverage provisions of the insurance policy issued
by Aetna. In resolving this issue, the court relied on Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. American Employers Insurance Co.,6° which held that in order
for one to be a borrower of a vehicle one must have use and possession of the
vehicle.61 The court noted that the loading of the vehicle in question by
Atlas was no doubt a use of the vehicle. 62 Possession of the truck, on the
other hand, was not so clear. The court construed possession to mean the
right to exercise dominion and control over the truck.63 No evidence was
presented that Atlas had such a right, and for that reason Atlas was not a
borrower under the policy and Aetna had no duty to defend. 64
Rhodes v. Chicago Insurance Co. 65 involved a suit by Rhodes seeking dam-
ages that had been agreed upon by Rhodes and Chicago's insured in a prior
state court proceeding. Rhodes had applied for a modeling position and was
interviewed by a counselor. Rhodes alleged that during subsequent counsel-
ing, the counselor engaged in sexual misconduct with her, hypnotized her,
and was otherwise negligent in performing his duties as a personal and gui-
dance counselor. Chicago and Interstate Fire and Casualty Company were
the malpractice insurers for the counselor under a group policy. Chicago
refused to defend the counselor under Rhodes's original complaint and did
not respond to a request for a defense under the first amended original com-
plaint. Chicago, however, tendered a defense to the counselor under the sec-
ond amended original complaint only under reservation of rights. The
reservation of rights was tendered because the insurers contended that sexual
misconduct was not covered by the policy. The counselor refused the tender
and pursued his own defense. He subsequently settled the case in state
court. This lawsuit arose out of the claim by Rhodes against Chicago in
which Rhodes sought payment of the assessed damages.
The court held that the insurer's duty under Texas law to defend is deter-
mined solely from the face of the pleadings without reference to facts outside
the pleadings. 66 Whether a complaint pleads in the alternative or alleges
more than one cause of action, the insurer is obligated to defend, as long as
the complaint alleges at least one cause of action within the coverage of the
policy.67 The court did not decide the issue of whether the carrier's duty to
defend arose in the original, first amended, or second amended complaint.
damage arising out of the loading or unloading thereof, such other person
shall be an insured only if he is:
(1) a lessee or borrower of the automobile, or
(2) an employee of the named insured or of such lessee or
borrower ....
Id. at 292.
60. 556 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1977).
61. Id. at 245.
62. 661 S.W.2d at 292.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 719 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1983).
66. Id. at 119.
67. See Superior Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 358 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1962,
1985]
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The question presented in this case was the effect on the carrier of its failure
to defend.
Once an insurer breaches its duty to defend, the insured is free to proceed
as he sees fit, engage his own counsel, and either settle or litigate at his op-
tion.68 Having breached it duty to defend, the insurer is bound by the settle-
ment or judgment. 69 In addition, the insurer who breaches his duty to
defend does not have the ability to enforce against the insured any condi-
tions of the policy, and the insured is no longer constrained by no-action and
no-voluntary-assumption-of-liability clauses.70 The carrier is liable for any
damages up to the policy limits assessed against the insured, subject only to
the condition that any settlement be reasonable. 7 1
The court explained the complexity of the situation if the duty to defend
arose under the second amended original complaint. In that situation the
carrier offered to defend, but only with the reservation of rights. The court
noted that a reservation of rights is a proper action if the insurer believes, in
good faith, that the complaint alleges conduct that may not be covered by
the policy. 72 Notice of intent to reserve rights must be timely and in suffi-
cient form to inform the insured of the carrier's position. 73 A reservation of
rights, however, allows the insurer to refuse a tender of defense and pursue
his own defense. The carrier would remain liable for attorney's fees if it has
the duty to defend and may not insist on conducting the defense. 74 The
carrier also is barred from enforcing voluntary assumption of the liability in
no-action clauses.75
The court stated that if the insurer breached its duty to defend, the insurer
is bound to pay any damages up to the policy limits assessed against the
insured. 76 If the insured properly reserved its rights and the insured elected
to pursue its own defense, the carrier is bound to pay damages that resulted
from covered conduct and that were reasonable and prudent up to the policy
limits. 77 In either situation, however, the insured is not constrained by con-
ditions in the policy that limit the insured's ability to settle the claim, and
the carrier cannot object to the insured's conduct of the defense. 78
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Moritz, 138 S.W.2d 1095 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1940, writ ref'd).
68. See Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Corpus Christi, 192 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1946, writ refd n.r.e.).
69. Ridgeway v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 578 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1978); Ranger Ins. Co. v.
Rodgers, 530 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
70. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Parker Prods., Inc., 498 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1973).
71. See Blakely v. American Employers Ins. Co., 424 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1970) (an insurer
may be liable even for amounts in excess of the policy limits).
72. 719 F.2d at 120.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Equipment Rental Co., 345 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).






"Bad Faith" Claims for Extracontractual Damages. In Thompson v. M & B.
Construction Corp. 79 the federal district court, following recent Texas prece-
dent,80 held that no cause of action exists under Texas law against a property
insurer for an alleged bad faith denial of a claim. Thompson's building col-
lapsed when a contractor removed lateral supports during construction of a
water pipeline near the building. When Thompson's claim for proceeds
under his property insurance policy was denied, he sued both the contractor
and his insurer, American Economy Insurance Company. Thompson made
claim against American Economy not only for policy proceeds, but also for
$500,000 in exemplary damages on the theory that the insurer had breached
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to investigate
the loss fully before denying the claim.81 American Economy moved for
partial summary judgment on the claim for exemplary damages, on the
ground that Texas law recognized no such cause of action.
The court agreed and dismissed the exemplary damages claim. 82 Exem-
plary damages are not available for breach of contract in Texas, even when
the breach is malicious or willful, unless a separate tort is also alleged and
proved.83 The court examined the recent case of English v. Fischer,4 in
which the Texas Supreme Court declined to create and read into all Texas
contracts an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, expressly rejecting
the California bad faith tort theory. English v. Fischer controlled the
Thompson result and forced the court to dismiss the exemplary damages
claim against American Economy.8 5
Arson Defense. In Western Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanchez8 6 the court reaf-
firmed the rule that, when spouses have a joint interest in insured property,
the arson of one spouse will bar not only his own insurance claim, but also
that of the innocent spouse. Under the facts stipulated in the trial court,
Western Fire Insurance Company issued a fire policy to Charlotte Sanchez
79. 585 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
80. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981).
81. 585 F. Supp. at 562.
82. Id. at 563.
83. Id.; see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 571 (Tex. 1981); A.L. Carter
Lumber Co. v. Saide, 140 Tex. 523, 526, 168 S.W.2d 629, 631 (1943).
84. 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
85. In English v. Fischer the court held:
A basis for the judgments below was the adoption of a novel theory of law enun-
ciated only by California courts. That theory holds that in every contract there
is an implied covenant that neither party will do anything which injures the
right of the other party to receive the benefits of the agreement. The courts
below called this a covenant of "good faith and fair dealing."
This concept is contrary to our well-reasoned and long-established adversary
system which has served us ably in Texas for almost 150 years . . . .The novel
concept advocated by the courts below would abolish our system of government
according to settled rules of law and let each case be decided upon what might
seem "fair and in good faith," by each fact finder. This we are unwilling to do.
Id. at 522.
86. 671 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
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in January 1980 covering her residence up to a maximum limit of $64,000.
Charlotte was married, but owned the house as her separate property. She
and her husband Delfin occupied the house together as their homestead at
the time of the fire in December 1980. Delfin intentionally set the fire with-
out the knowledge or participation of Charlotte, causing damages of over
$36,000. The trial court rendered judgment for Charlotte on the policy,
holding that since Delfin owned no interest in the house and was not an
insured under the policy, Delfin's arson would not bar Charlotte's claim.
The court reasoned that since Delfin did not own the residence, the public
policy rationale of the arson defense, preventing profit from wrongdoing,
was inapplicable.
The court of appeals reversed and rendered a take nothing judgment. 87
Delfin owned a homestead interest in the property jointly with Charlotte,
notwithstanding the fact that the residence was her separate property. A
homestead right is an estate in land in the nature of a legal life estate created
by operation of law.8 8 The court followed the established rule89 that when
two persons have a joint interest in property, intentional burning by one will
bar the claim of the other. One of the early cases relied upon by the court,
Bridges v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co.,9° specifically held a home-
stead right to be a sufficient joint interest to bar the claim of the innocent
spouse.
The Texas rule barring the claim of the innocent spouse reflects sound
public policy and economic reality. When ownership of the insured property
is joint, payment of insurance proceeds to the innocent owner necessarily
benefits the wrongdoer. Within the facts of the Sanchez case, if the insur-
ance proceeds were used to repair the damage to the home, the guilty spouse
living in the house at the time of trial would obviously benefit. If the prop-
erty were jointly owned as community property, as would normally be true
for marital property in Texas, payment of proceeds to the innocent spouse
would necessarily benefit the community estate. When the property is mort-
gaged, payment and discharge of the mortgage debt would necessarily bene-
fit the guilty as well as the innocent owner. The Texas rule, therefore, is
clearly consistent with the public policy underlying the arson defense, to
avoid rewarding a wrongdoer and deter insurance fraud. Further, when in-
tentional wrongdoing is proved on the part of one joint owner, the ever pres-
ent potential for collusion or passive acquiescence on the part of the innocent
spouse provides additional justification for the rule. The rule will act to de-
ter even passive participation and encourage vigilance on the part of the in-
nocent spouse. Until recent years, the rule denying recovery to an innocent
87. Id. at 670.
88. Id. at 668.
89. See Bridges v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 252 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1952, no writ) (innocent husband barred from collecting fire insurance proceeds
when wife intentionally set fire to building); Jones v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp., 250 S.W.2d
281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1952, writ ref'd) (innocent divorced wife barred from insurance
proceeds recovery when former husband intentionally burned property).
90. 252 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, no writ).
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spouse has been regarded as the majority rule, but in the past decade other
states increasingly have begun permitting recovery by innocent spouses.91
Sanchez, therefore, stands as an exception to the current trend.92 In another
arson case, Buffkin v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. ,93 the court
reaffirmed the rule that results of a polygraph examination are not
admissible.94
Accidental Loss. Traditionally insurance only covers fortuitous or accidental
losses, not those losses that are certain to occur or intentionally caused.95 In
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brock96 the court con-
strued the term "accidental" in an automobile collision policy. The insured,
Brock, while driving his car, saw Hawkins in a second vehicle. Hawkins
pointed a shotgun in the direction of a third vehicle in which Brock's sister
was a passenger. Brock drove into the Hawkins' vehicle deliberately to "pre-
vent someone getting shot, like my sister."' 97 Brock sued on his auto policy
for collision damage to his vehicle and obtained a favorable jury verdict on
which the trial court rendered judgment.
The appellate court reversed, holding that as a matter of law the damage
was not accidental. 98 Applying a test developed in life insurance controver-
sies, the court held that an injury is considered accidental only if "from the
viewpoint of the insured, the injuries are not the natural and probable conse-
quence of the action or occurrence which produced the injury." 99 Since
Brock's driving into Hawkins' vehicle was admittedly deliberate, the damage
was not accidental.
Other Insurance. In Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones1°°
the court determined the proper measure of recovery when two separate pol-
icies cover the same property and considered evidentiary questions related to
proof of motive for arson. The insured, Jones, bought a tornado-damaged
mobile home for $5,000, spent about $700 for building materials, and per-
sonally performed some repair work on the mobile home with the assistance
91. See, e.g., Butler & Freemon, The Innocent Coinsured: He Burns It, She Claims-
Windfall or Technical Injustice?, 17 FORUM 187 (1981); Annot., 11 A.L.R. 4TH 1228 (1982).
92. Washington, another community property state, has also created an exception to the
current trend. See Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Strong, 36 Wash. App. 256, 673 P.2d 873 (1983).
93. 658 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
94. Id. at 322.
95. Life insurance is an exception to this rule, since death is a certainty. See generally S.
Cozen, Fortuity: The Unnamed Exclusion (unpublished paper presented to the Joint Meeting
of the Property Insurance Law Committee and the Excess, Surplus Lines and Reinsurance
Committee of the Tort and Insurance Practice Section of the American Bar Association, Chi-
cago, Illinois, Aug. 7, 1984) [probably to be published in The Forum]. For a recent judicial
discussion of the concepts of risk, fortuity, and accident in insurance law, see Compagnie des
Bauxites des Guinee v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 554 F. Supp. 1080 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 724
F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1983).
96. 659 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
97. Id. at 166.
98. Id. at 167.
99. Id. (quoting from Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex.
1976)).
100. 660 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Forth Worth 1983, no writ).
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of family members. Jones then purchased a $25,000 fire policy with Farmers
and a second $20,000 policy with EMMCO Insurance Company. Each pol-
icy contained an other insurance clause and a pro rata clause, providing that
the insurer would be liable for loss in the proportion that its policy's limits
bore to the total coverage on the risk.
The mobile home was damaged by fire and Jones sued on both policies.
EMMCO settled with Jones for $12,000, but Farmers Mutual asserted arson
by the insurer as a defense. At trial estimates of the mobile home's pre-fire
value ranged from $8,000 to $38,000. Jones estimated the value at $32,000
to $38,000. The jury found in favor of Jones on the liability issue and fixed
the value of the mobile home at $12,300 and the value of the contents at
$10,444. The trial court accordingly rendered judgment against Farmer for
$10,444 (the amount of the contents loss) plus $6,833 (25/45th of $12,300,
the value of the home as found by the jury), plus interest.
On appeal Farmers argued that the $12,000 settlement from EMMCO
should be credited against the $12,300 found by the jury to be the value of
the mobile home. Furthermore, it argued that evidence of the original
purchase price and other insurance should have been admitted on the ques-
tion of motive. The appellate court rejected these arguments and af-
firmed.101 When two or more policies with pro rata clauses cover the same
property, each is considered separately and independently, and payment or
settlement of a claim under one policy does not alter the measure of recovery
under another. 10 2 Even if one insurer pays the entire loss, the liability of the
other will not be discharged.10 3 The court, thus, held that Farmers was
properly denied a credit or offset for the EMMCO payment. 0 4
On the evidentiary questions the court held that the original purchase
price of the mobile home and the existence of the EMMCO policy were
properly excluded from evidence, because the probable prejudice of these
facts far outweighed their marginal relevance. 105 This ruling rests on faulty
reasoning. The evidence was offered to show financial or profit motive on
the part of the insured. 106 An arson defense must frequently be proved cir-
cumstantially, and financial motive is an essential part of the insurer's
proof. 0 7 In arson cases the evidence should be permitted a wide scope,108
101. Id. at 881-82.
102. Id. at 881.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 881-82.
105. Id. at 882.
106. Id.
107. See generally Garrett v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 635, 636-37 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1976, writ refd n.r.e.) (evidence that insured increased policy amount was
relevant).
108. The courts have recognized that "[a]rson may be established by circumstantial evi-
dence." Garrett v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Payne v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 409 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1966, writ refd n.r.e.); Williams v. Banker's Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 277
S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1955, writ dism'd); Joy v. Liverpool, London &
Globe Ins. Co., 74 S.W. 822, 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1903, writ refd). A corollary
to this rule is that circumstantial evidence is admissible broadly, objections on the ground of
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the question of its weight being for the jury. In Jones a possible profit motive
clearly would have been demonstrated by showing insurance in a total
amount substantially higher than the insured's own valuation of the prop-
erty, over three times greater than the actual value as found by the jury, and
over seven times greater than the insured's cash investment in the mobile
home.
Two Fires, Two Occurrences, Two Deductibles. In Goose Creek Consolidated
Independent School District v. Continental Casualty Co. 109 the court deter-
mined that two fires in separate buildings were two loss occurrences and that
the deductible amount should be applied separately to each. Goose Creek
bought a single fire policy covering several buildings. In the early morning
hours of December 23, 1979, fires occurred within about one and one-half
hours at two separate insured properties. The Baytown Fire Department
concluded that each fire was the result of arson. The insurer paid the losses,
except for $200,000, which represented a separate application of the
$100,000 deductible to each loss. Goose Creek sued the insurer for
$100,000, contending that the two fires should be considered a single loss
occurrence within the meaning of the policy, since a single individual or
group probably set both fires as part of a single scheme or plan. The appel-
late court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the insurer. 110 The
policy defined "loss occurrence" as a loss arising out of a single event.'1
The court held that the ordinary meaning of single event required consider-
ing each fire as a separate loss occurrence. 112 The court was unpersuaded,
relevancy being disfavored. In Garrett v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d at 638, the court
said:
The crime of arson, being in defiance of law, is ordinarily conceived in secrecy
and executed in such a manner as to avoid detection and exposure; and proof of
such an unlawful enterprise must, in the very nature of things, be made by cir-
cumstances, and every circumstance which tends to cast light upon the incident
is legitimate and proper.
Similarly, in Joy v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 74 S.W. at 825, the court said: "In
the proof of an issue of such a character as arson, involving, as it does, such moral turpitude
and criminal intent, every circumstance tending to prove the guilt of the party charged with
the commission of the offense is admissible in evidence." Perhaps the best statement concern-
ing the scope of admissibility of circumstantial evidence in arson cases is found in Girard v.
Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 A. 666, 668-69 (1931) [citations omitted],
wherein the court said:
As we have often said, when fraud is the issue, the evidence necessarily takes a
wide range. . . . So here, though the fraud in its ultimate aspect was the burn-
ing of the buildings, any fact or circumstance, before or after that event, which
in any way indicated a purpose to accomplish that fraudulent result, was admis-
sible. Indeed, that ultimate fact might be wholly established by circumstantial
evidence. . . . And, when such evidence is resorted to, objections to testimony
on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored, because the force and effect of
circumstantial facts depend largely upon their relation to each other; the acts
and circumstances, although wholly unconclusive when separately considered,
may by their number and joint operation be entirely sufficient to establish the
factum probandum.
109. 658 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
110. Id. at 341.
11. Id. at 340.
112. Id. at 341.
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under the policy language, that two fires set at different times and places
should be considered part of a process of continuum. 11 3
Suit Limitation Clause. The Houston court of appeals considered the valid-
ity of a savings clause in a contractual limitations provision of an insurance
policy in Duster v. Aetna Insurance Co. 114 Duster bought a policy from
Aetna covering his yacht. The policy provided that no suit upon the policy
could be maintained unless brought within twelve months after the loss, or
within the shortest time permitted by applicable state law. A loss occurred
in September 1979, but Duster did not file suit until February of 1982, over
two years later and well beyond the twelve-month period specified in the
policy. The trial court rendered a summary judgment in the insurer's favor
on the basis of the suit limitation clause, but the appellate court reversed and
remanded, holding the limitations clause void. 115 Article 5545116 permits
parties to fix a limitation period for actions on a contract at not less than two
years. Since the statute clearly prohibited the twelve-month period specified,
the issue on appeal was the validity of the policy's savings clause, which
specified the shortest limit of time permitted by state law as an alternative
limitations period. In approaching the question, the court adverted to the
two rules of construction that ambiguities must be construed against the au-
thor of a contract and that policy provisions should be construed strictly
against the insurer. 17 It held that the savings clause was not sufficiently
specific to survive under these two rules.118 Absent a valid limitations pe-
riod in the contract, the four-year statute11 9 for written contracts applied.
Since the suit was filed within the four-year period, it was remanded for
trial. 120
Hitting Chug Hole as Collision. In Nutchey v. Three R's Trucking Co. 121 the
court held that damage to a trailer caused by impact with a sudden depres-
sion in the roadbed, or chug hole, constituted a collision loss within the
meaning of an insurance policy. 12 2 After the loss occurred, the owner of the
trailer, Three R's Trucking Co., sued on the policy, claiming that the trailer
was damaged beyond repair by a collision with a chug hole. The insurer
denied the claim on the basis of the exclusion for "wear and tear ....
mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure."' 123 The trial court rendered
summary judgment for Three R's in the amount of $15,000, and the appel-
late court affirmed. 124 The court reviewed the rules of construction that re-
113. Id. at 340.
114. 668 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd).
115. Id. at 807.
116. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5545 (Vernon 1958).
117. 668 S.W.2d at 807.
118. Id.
119. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon 1958).
120. 668 S.W.2d at 807.
121. 674 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
122. Id. at 931.
123. Id. at 930.
124. Id. at 932.
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quire resolution of ambiguities in favor of coverage, as well as previous
opinions dealing with similar policy provisions, and concluded that a colli-
sion can occur when the vehicle strikes only the roadbed. 25
Squirrel As Vermin. Homeowner's insurance policies in Texas contain an
exclusion for loss caused by "vermin," but do not define that term. In Jones
v. American Economy Insurance Co. 126 the Joneses claimed under their
homeowners policy for approximately $2,300 damage to their house and fur-
niture caused by a squirrel, and the insurer asserted the vermin exclusion.
The trial court rendered summary judgment for the insurer, but the appel-
late court reversed. Finding cases from other jurisdictions divided on the
question, the court considered the dictionary definition and ordinary mean-
ing of vermin. It concluded that the term has no generally accepted meaning
as applied to squirrels. "Vermin," therefore, was ambiguous and should be
construed in favor of coverage. The court accordingly reversed and ren-
dered judgment for the insureds. 127
Subrogation to Insured's Contractual Rights. In Duval County Ranch Co. v.
Alamo Lumber Co. 128 the court considered the rights of owner, lienholder,
and insurer after a fire loss. The Duval County Ranch Co., as owner, con-
tracted with Alamo Lumber Co., as general contractor, for the construction
of a ranch house in Duval County. Alamo built the house, but a dispute
arose as to the amount Duval owed Alamo for the construction. Alamo
sued and obtained a judgment against Duval in the amount of
$443,414.05.129 The judgment also provided for foreclosure of Alamo's
mechanic's lien on the tract of land where the ranch house was built.
During the appeal from that judgment, the house was totally destroyed by
fire, and Duval and Alamo were paid by their respective insurers.' 30 Duval
then sued Alamo, claiming that Duval was entitled to insurance proceeds
received by Alamo and that those proceeds should be credited upon Alamo's
$443,414.05 judgment. Alamo's insurers intervened, seking subrogation to
the extent of payment to Alamo's judgment against Duval. The trial court
rendered judgment on the jury verdict, denying Duval's claim for the pro-
ceeds of Alamo's insurance policies and granting to the intervening insurers
a subrogation interest in Alamo's original judgment. Both Duval and
Alamo appealed.
Duval argued that under equitable principles 31 it should receive the bene-
125. Id. at 931.
126. 672 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
127. Id. at 881.
128. 663 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
129. Id. at 630; see Duval County Ranch Co. v. Alamo Lumber Co., 597 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
130. Alamo Lumber Company was paid $330,610.20 and Duval was paid $350,000. 663
S.W.2d at 630-31.
131. When an owner agrees to insure both his own interest in property and that of the
mortgagee, but fails to insure the interest of the mortgagee, the mortgagee is entitled to a lien
on the insurance proceeds payable to the owner. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Super-Cold
Southwest Co., 225 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Duval
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fit of the insurance payment to Alamo because Alamo would otherwise re-
ceive a double recovery and be unjustly enriched. The court rejected this
argument, observing that Alamo, as lienholder on the property, clearly had
an insurable interest. 132 Relying on the rule that contracts of insurance are
personal and that ordinarily a stranger to the policy is not entitled to main-
tain a claim on it, the court held that Alamo's insurers properly paid their
named insured and that Duval had no valid claim for the proceeds. 133 The
court noted that awarding Alamo's insurance proceeds to Duval would in
fact give Duval a double recovery, since Duval had already received the pro-
ceeds of its own policy. 134
Alamo challenged its own insurers' right to a partial interest in its original
$443,414.05 judgment against Duval on the basis of the mortgagee clause
found in the policies that provided for subrogation to the mortgagee's rights
when the insurer makes payment to the mortgagee, but denies the owner's
claim. 135 Alamo argued that because the $330,610.20 insurance proceeds
received from its insurers were insufficient to pay the entire mortgage debt,
the insurers should acquire no subrogation rights in Alamo's original judg-
ment under the policy language. The court rejected this argument, noting
the Texas courts' policy favoring subrogation rights and the importance of
upholding that policy. 136 The court expressly avoided passing on the ques-
tion of who would be entitled to first monies out of the judgment, as between
Alamo and its subrogated insurers. 137
IV. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT AND TEXAS INSURANCE CODE
Consumer Under DTPA.138 In Gibbs v. Main Bank 139 the court decided sev-
eral questions concerning the availability of remedies under the DTPA for a
purchaser of title insurance. Gibbs bought a small apartment complex from
Wortham Investments, Inc. in 1975. Before the closing he received a prelim-
inary title report from Guardian Title Company, and at closing a title policy
based its claim to Alamo's insurance proceeds first upon an alleged agreement by Alamo to
insure the interest of Duval. The jury, however, failed to find that Alamo had made such an
agreement. 663 S.W.2d at 631. Having failed to secure the necessary jury finding to invoke
the rule of the Super-Cold case, Duval asserted that it should recover Alamo's insurance pro-
ceeds upon equitable principles, regardless of any agreement by Alamo to insure Duval's
interest.
132. 663 S.W.2d at 632.
133. Id. at 632, 637.
134. Id. at 632.
135. The mortgage clause provided:
If this Company shall claim that no liability existed as to the mortgagor or
owner, it shall, to the extent of payment of loss to the mortgage, be subrogated
to all of the mortgagee's rights of recovery, but without impairing mortgagee's
right to sue; or it may pay off the mortgage debt and require an assignment




138. "DTPA" indicates the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act,
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
139. 666 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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was issued to him by Safeco Title Insurance Company. Neither the prelimi-
nary report nor the title policy listed a $10,000 lien against the policy held by
William Craig. In 1976 Gibbs learned that Main Bank of Houston, assignee
of the Craig note and lien, had foreclosed and caused the property to be sold
at public auction. Unsuccessful in his suit to set aside the foreclosure, Gibbs
sued the title company (Guardian), the title insurer (Safeco), his seller (Wor-
tham Investments), and its principal, alleging an action on the title policy
and also fraud and violations of the DTPA and Texas Insurance Code article
21.21.140 The trial court directed a verdict in favor of all defendants, and
Gibbs appealed.
The first issue presented on appeal was limitations. Gibbs learned of the
undisclosed Craig lien on December 9, 1976, and filed suit against the
DTPA defendants more than two but less than four years later. The court
made the assumption that Gibb's DTPA cause of action arose when he first
learned of the outstanding lien in 1976.14 A two-year limitations provision
was added to the DTPA effective August 27, 1979,142 but no specific limita-
tions statute applied to the DTPA before that date. Since the acts of which
Gibbs complained occurred before 1979, the court looked to the general lim-
itations statutes. It determined that the four-year statute for written con-
tracts applied, 143 reasoning that his DTPA and article 21.21 claims were
derived from transactions in writing. 44 The court also held that fact issues
were present on whether the defendants were estopped to assert limitations,
since some statements by defendants may have induced Gibbs to postpone
suit.145 The defendants may have also fraudulently concealed their own
roles and responsibility until well beyond the date Gibbs first learned of the
Craig lien. 146
The court next decided whether Gibbs was a consumer with standing to
sue under the DTPA, as amended in 1975. A frequent threshhold matter in
DTPA cases is the question of which version of the act applies. The court
selected the 1975 version of the DTPA (the 1975 Act) as applicable because
the title report and title policy omitting the Craig lien were issued in 1975.147
Consumer in the 1975 Act included an individual "who seeks or acquires by
140. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981) and the DTPA were enacted together
in 1973 as parts of the same legislative bill. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 143, at 322. Originally
the two statutes were largely identical. In the 11 years since its original enactment, the DTPA
has been amended substantially, but art. 21.21, whether through design or oversight, has not
been amended since 1973. Although the differences between the two statutes are now substan-
tial, each refers to the other, and they are evidently intended to be read together. The courts
seldom distinguish between the DTPA and art. 21.21 in suits against insurance companies.
See, e.g., Dykes & Nistico, Insurers' Liability for Deceptive Trade Practices in Texas, 1 TEX.
INS. L. REP. 33 (1983). No such distinction is made in the Gibbs opinion, and none will be
attempted in this Article.
141. 666 S.W.2d at 558.
142. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56A (Vernon Supp. 1984).
143. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon 1958).
144. 666 S.W.2d at 558.
145. Id. at 558-59.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 558.
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purchase or lease, any goods or services."1 48 The definition of services, how-
ever, excluded services for business or commercial use. 149 Guardian and
Safeco argued that their furnishing a title report and a policy of title insur-
ance were commercial services outside the scope of the 1975 Act. The court
disagreed on two grounds. First, the substance of Gibbs's action related to
the purchase of real estate, a good150 under the 1975 Act, and the alleged
violations occurred in connection with the real estate transaction. 5 ' Sec-
ond, inasmuch as Gibbs purchased the apartments as part of a personal in-
vestment plan, and not for resale or production of other goods, the court
held that the services in question were not commercial under the facts.1 52
Last, the court rejected Guardian's and Safeco's argument that no action
would lie under the DTPA because as mere insurers and indemnitors against
title failure, they owed no duty to disclose the outstanding lien. The court
held that the DTPA, even before the 1979 amendments that added a specific
section on nondisclosure of material facts, 153 was intended to reach a con-
spiracy to conceal material information. Finding that Gibbs's liability theo-
ries were realistic and supported by evidence at trial, the court reversed and
remanded.
Insurance as a Service Under the DTPA. In McCrann v. Klaneckey154 the
trial court sitting without a jury found that insurance agent McCrann had
misled the plaintiffs by telling them that they had automobile liability insur-
ance when they did not. The plaintiffs had a minor traffic accident on Au-
gust 2, 1980, while uninsured, and were awarded treble damages plus
attorney's fees under the DTPA against the agent. On appeal, the agent
urged that sale of insurance was outside of the scope of the DTPA because
insurance is intangible property, and neither a good nor a service within the
Act. The court rejected this argument and followed other opinions that have
either assumed or held that insurance is a service within the meaning of the
DTPA.155
Pre-Loss Misrepresentation. An insurance agent's pre-loss misrepresentation
to an insured concerning the coverage provided by his policy, relied on by
the insured to his detriment, subjects the company to liability for treble dam-
148. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Under the 1975
DTPA, "consumer" was defined as "an individual, partnership, [or] corporation ... who
seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services." Id. § 17.45(4). "Goods" were
defined as "tangible chattels or real property purchased or leased for use." Id. § 17.45(1).
"Services" were defined as "work, labor, or service purchased or leased for use, including
services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods." Id. § 17.45(2).
149. Id. § 17.45(2).
150. Id. § 17.45(1).
151. 666 S.W.2d at 559.
152, Id.
153. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(22) (Vernon Supp. 1985) was added by
amendment effective Aug. 27, 1979.
154. 667 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
155. Id. at 926.
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ages under the DTPA and article 21.21.156 This rule was applied in Tide-
lands Life Insurance Co. v. Harris.157 In Harris the trial court found that the
agent misrepresented the terms of a family health policy to the plaintiff, by
telling him that future heart problems would be covered notwithstanding the
plaintiff's known, existing heart condition. The policy in fact contained an
exclusion for preexisting conditions. The parties stipulated that the exclu-
sion applied to coverage for plaintiff's subsequent heart attack. The court
found that the agent had actual and apparent authority to represent the pol-
icy terms to prospective insureds, and that but for his misrepresentation the
plaintiff would have purchased other coverage. The plaintiff was awarded
three times his medical expenses plus attorney's fees in the trial court.
The primary issue on appeal was whether the company could be subjected
to liability on account of the agent's statements. The court ruled that the
company was properly held responsible, by reason of the trial court's fact
findings on actual and apparent authority and by reason of Texas Insurance
Code article 21.02-1, which statutorily establishes one who takes policy
applications as an agent of the insurer. 158
Post-Loss Misrepresentations. The courts have generally held that post-loss
conduct does not give rise to liability under the DTPA or article 21.21, be-
cause the insured's rights under the policy are fixed at the moment of loss
and are not altered by later conduct of the insurer or its adjusters.159 Never-
theless, Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Brown16° imposed liability
for treble damages for an insurer's post-loss conduct.
In January of 1978 Brown contacted Avrohm Wisenberg of the Sol L.
Wisenberg Insurance Agency to purchase fire coverage for his commercial
buildings, in which he operated an industrial rag recycling business. The
business stored tons of highly flammable cloth near hot dryers and was a
high fire insurance risk. Wisenberg secured the coverage through Bellefonte
Underwriters Insurance Company, a surplus lines carrier, and six other car-
riers, who shared in the risk as coinsurers. The premiums charged to Brown
156. Royal Globe v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1979).
157. 675 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
158. Id. at 227. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.02-1 (Vernon 1981) reads in part:
Whoever solicits insurance on behalf of any insurance company, . . . or who
takes or transmits. . . any application for insurance, or any policy of insurance,
to or from such company,. . . or shall receive or deliver a policy of insurance of
any such company, . . . or receive or collect or transmit any premium of insur-
ance. . . or do any other act in the making or consummating of any contract of
insurance for or with any such insurance company . . . shall be held to be the
agent of the company for which the act is done or the risk taken ....
159. See McKnight v. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 362, 366 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Rosell
v. Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no
writ); American Ins. Co. v. Reed, 626 S.W.2d 898, 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no
writ); Rodriguez v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 598 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Legate, 578
S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v.
Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
160. 663 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
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were discounted because of an automatic wet sprinkler system 16 1 in one of
the buildings, and the policy contained an automatic sprinkler clause that
provided that the insured must exercise due diligence in maintaining the
sprinkler system. 162 Within three days of the time the coverage was initially
bound with Bellefonte, Wisenberg forwarded to Bellefonte's agent, Armco
Underwriters Agency of Texas, Inc., an engineering report and other papers.
The report recommended conversion from a wet system to a dry system, but
noted that Brown did not intend to implement this recommendation at that
time. 163 The papers also explicitly described Brown's customary practice of
draining the sprinkler system when freezing weather was predicted. On Feb-
ruary 20, 1978, about one month after Brown obtained the coverage, freez-
ing weather was predicted and Brown drained the wet sprinkler system. In
the morning hours of February 21, the building was destroyed by fire.
Brown submitted his proof of loss and initially all carriers were inclined to
pay the loss, but a property manager with Armco erroneously concluded
that Wisenberg had misrepresented the nature of the sprinkler system and
had failed to advise the carriers that the wet sprinkler system was drained
and inoperative in freezing weather. The Armco property manager telexed
his conclusion to one of the coinsurers, Lloyds of London, and sought con-
currence to deny the claim on the basis of Wisenberg's alleged misrepresen-
tation concerning the system and failure to notify that it would be drained in
freezing weather. All carriers except Bellefonte paid their portions of the
claim, but Bellefonte denied the claim on the basis of Wisenberg's alleged
misrepresentations, violation of the automatic sprinkler clause, and material
increase in hazard within the knowledge and control of the insured. A com-
plex multiparty suit followed, in which Brown sued Bellefonte on the policy
and Wisenberg sued Bellefonte for libel and violation of article 21.21, on the
basis of Armco's telex to Lloyds of London. Brown and Wisenberg pre-
vailed on these claims after a lengthy trial, and those portions of the judg-
ment were affirmed on appeal. The jury found Wisenberg's damages due to
the libelous telex to be $50,000, and this figure was trebled in the trial court's
judgment.
Bellefonte argued on appeal that damages found in favor of Wisenberg on
account of the libelous telex should not be trebled, but the court disagreed.
The court first pointed out that Wisenberg had pleaded article 21.21, and
161. A wet sprinkler system has water in the pipes continuously, whereas water enters the
pipes of a dry system only when the system is triggered. Id. at 570 n. 1.
162. The clause provided:
This policy being written at a reduced rate, based on the protection of the
premises by automatic sprinkler, it is a condition of this policy that, in so far as
the sprinkler equipment and the water supplies therefor, and in connection
therewith the approved Central Station sprinkler supervisory service complete,
are under the control of the assured, due diligence shall be used by the assured
to maintain them in complete working order, and that, on the premises of as-
sured, no change shall be made in said water supplies and/or the Central Station
sprinkler supervisory service complete without the consent of this company in
writing.
Id. at 571 n.4.
163. Id. at 570.
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that section 4(2) of that statute declares untrue statements about persons in
the insurance business to be unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the
business of insurance.164 Section 16 of article 21.21165 creates a treble dam-
ages remedy for persons injured by acts described in section 4. The court
held that since Wisenberg had established an untrue statement about him-
self, which caused $50,000 damages according to the jury verdict, the trial
court properly rendered judgment for three times this amount plus attor-
ney's fees under article 21.21.166 The court thus used article 21.21 to treble a
libel award.
As to Brown's action on the policy, Bellefonte argued that Brown had
violated the automatic sprinkler clause as a matter of law and failed to exer-
cise due diligence to maintain the system in working order by draining the
pipes on the night of the freeze. The court rejected this argument, holding
that the due diligence language was ambiguous under the circumstance of
freezing weather, since not draining the system would cause the pipes to
rupture and thus inevitably prevent the system from being in working or-
der. 167 The court disposed of Bellefonte's argument that draining the system
violated the policy condition relating to increase in hazard on similar
grounds. The court noted that the hazard would have been increased even if
the pipes had not been drained, since they would have frozen and burst.168
It held the jury findings in favor of Brown on both the due diligence and
increase in hazard issues amply supported by the evidence. 169
The court also approved the award of attorney's fees to Brown and against
Bellefonte, holding that recovery of attorney's fees in an action on an insur-
ance policy is authorized under Texas Revised Civil Statute article 2226,
despite a clear proviso to the contrary in the statute. 170 The court's view,
though contrary to the plain language of the statute and to an earlier opinion
of the same appellate court, accords with two other opinions holding that
the proviso of article 2226 exempts suits on policies from its ambit only if
164. Id. at 584. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(2) (Vernon 1981) provides that
"causing, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed
before the public,. . . in any. . . way, an advertisement, announcement or statement contain-
ing any assertion, representation or statement. . . with respect to any person in the conduct of
his insurance business, which is untrue, deceptive or misleading" is an unfair and deceptive act
or practice in the insurance business.
165. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon 1981).
166. 663 S.W.2d at 584.
167. With reference to draining the pipes in freezing weather, the court observed that
"Brown was 'damned if he did and damned if he didn't' ... "Id. at 577.
168. Id. at 576.
169. Id.
170. The proviso of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1984) reads:
The provisions hereof shall not apply to contracts of insurers issued by insurers
subject to the provisions of the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act (Article
21.21-2, Insurance Code), nor shall it apply to contracts of any insurer subject
to the provisions of Article 3.62, Insurance Code, or to Chapter 387, Acts of the
55th Legislature, Regular Session, 1957, as amended (Article 3.62-1, Vernon's
Texas Insurance Code), or to Article 21.21, Insurance Code, as amended, or to
Chapter 9, Insurance Code, as amended, and each such article or chapter shall
be and remain in full force and effect.
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attorney's fees are recoverable under some other statute.171
Discovery of Claims Files. In Aztec Life Insurance Co. v. Dellana172 Jennings
sued on a credit life and disability policy, and the insurer, Aztec Life Insur-
ance Company, asserted the policy's exclusion for preexisting conditions as a
defense. Jennings alleged that Aztec had failed to investigate the claim
before denial and was guilty of bad faith and violations of the DTPA and
Texas Insurance Code article 21.21. In the trial court, Jennings sought pro-
duction both of Aztec's claims denial journal, which reflected the names of
other insureds whose claims were denied during the past seven years, and of
Aztec's claims files reflecting denials of other claims under the preexisting
condition exclusion. The trial court ordered production of the claims denial
journal, but not of the other files. Both parties sought further relief in the
appellate court through applications for writ of mandamus.
The appellate court conditionally granted Jennings' application, requiring
production of all the requested claims files. The court reasoned that the
other files "may well contain information relevant to Jennings' claim that
Aztec was engaged in a course of dealing that was unfair or deceptive in the
business of insurance."1 73 The court noted that the privacy interests of the
other climants could be adequately protected by in camera review of the files
by the trial court. 174
The wisdom of this ruling may be questioned. While the scope of discov-
ery extends to nonprivileged matters that appear "reasonably calculated to
relate to the discovery of evidence admissible at such trial,"' 75 the court did
not specify or describe the admissible evidence to which other claims files
would lead. The court suggests that if Aztec could be shown to have denied
without reasonable investigation other claims because of the preexisting con-
dition exclusions, then such evidence would be admissible to prove that Jen-
171. See Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 649 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burke, 614 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 621 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. 1981). The proper construction
of the proviso has not been authoritatively resolved. The supreme court seemed to favor the
plain language approach in Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Childress, 650 S.W.2d 770, 775
(Tex. 1983), when it said, "Art. 2226 does not apply to contracts of certain insurors who are
identified in those sections of the Insurance Code enumerated in Art. 2226."
172. 667 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
173. Id. at 915. The court's language, evidently taken from TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon 1981) suggests that its holding may be grounded on a fundamental
misconception of the scope of art. 21.21 and a failure to distinguish between art. 21.21 and id.
art. 21.21-2. The latter statute, known as the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act, em-
powers the attorney general to take action when certain prohibited practices are repeated
"without cause and with ... such frequency as determined by the State Board of Insurance."
Id. art. 21.21-2, § 2. Article 21.21-2 aims at repetitious patterns of conduct, but does not
create a private cause of action for the individual claimant. See, e.g., McKnight v. Ideal Mut.
Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Hi-Line Elec. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 587
S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 593 S.W.2d 953
(Tex. 1980); Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Article 21.21, by contrast, creates a private cause of action on the
basis of certain actions toward the insured, but does not require or cover repetitive practices.
174. 667 S.W.2d at 914.
175. TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a.
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nings' claim was similarly denied without reasonable investigation.176 Apart
from the difficulties in determining which investigations were reasonable, the
court's reasoning is fundamentally at odds with the principle that each par-
ticular claim must stand or fall on its own facts. A personal injury plaintiff's
prior claims are not admissible to show that the plaintiff is claims-conscious
or to suggest that the plaintiff's claim is fraudulent or made in bad faith. 177
The same rationale underlying exclusion of a plaintiff's other claims should
exclude evidence of other denials by an insurer.
The privacy interest of other claims should be considered, as the court
recognized. 178 The court suggested that privacy considerations could be
protected through an in camera inspection by the trial court. One may ques-
tion the efficacy of in camera review for the purpose of determining what
files and what parts of files are privileged or nondiscoverable by the trial
court when that endeavor will involve a large number of files and considera-
tion of subjective factors.
In Maryland American General Insurance Co. v. Blackmon 179 the supreme
court held that an insurer's claims file, reflecting its investigation of a claim
in litigation and its evaluation and mental processes, is privileged as work
product. The court rejected the insured's argument that the privilege should
be abrogated because of his allegation of bad faith, recognizing that such a
ruling would effectively vitiate the work-product privilege in all suits against
insurers. Plaintiffs could always overcome the privilege by the simple expe-
dient of alleging bad faith.18 0 The Dellana court failed to cite the Blackmon
opinion and failed to consider the extent and duration of the insurance com-
pany's privilege and right to keep its work product in other claims files confi-
dential. If the Dellana ruling is followed in future cases, insurers will be
threatened in every individual case with the prospect of trying the merits of
hundreds of other claims and defending its claims handling procedures and
practices broadly, in addition to dealing with the merits of the plaintiff's
claim. Even if other claims are thought to have some marginal relevance to
the merits of a particular individual claim asserted in litigation, the possible
prejudice that might flow from admitting evidence of other claims and the
extreme expenditure of time in litigating other claims would appear greatly
to outweigh such relevance. Finally, one may question the efficacy of in
camera review by the trial court for the purpose of determining what files
and what parts of files are privileged or nondiscoverable, particularly when
that endeavor will involve a large number of files, consideration of subjective
factors, and exercise of judgment.
176. 667 S.W.2d at 915.
177. See Brinkley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1959, no writ) (in worker's compensation case, evidence of 12 similar compensation claims
held inadmissible); San Antonio Traction Co. v. Cox, 184 S.W. 722 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1916, no writ) (in personal injury case, evidence of 17 similar claims by a plaintiff and
members of her family properly excluded).
178. 667 S.W.2d at 915-16.
179. 639 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1982).
180. Id. at 458.
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